We study a dynamic coordination process in which agents (1) are uncertain about the actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategically relevant information. Because of the uncertainty and the learning, (ir)reversibility of actions has important strategic consequences. We find that the reversibility option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and we characterize the direction of the effect based solely on simple features of the coordination problem.
Introduction
An agent fearing an economic crisis exhibits strategic uncertainty. She is uncertain about the future of the economy because she does not know how fellow agents perceive the odds of the crisis and hence how they will act. Additionally, such an agent awaits strategically valuable information as the crisis unfolds. Therefore her early investment decisions and, at the aggregate level, the final outcome of the crisis may crucially depend on the reversibility of the early actions. The effects of reversibility are complex. On the one hand reversibility allows agents to react early to crises, but on the other hand it may deepen the late stages of crises.
Our starting observation, that of strategic uncertainty at the outset of crisis, is well formalized in the global games literature. A global game is an incomplete information coordination game. Players receive private signals about an underlying economic fundamental and, in the unique equilibrium, player types above a certain threshold invest. Our uncertain agent fearing the crisis corresponds to the threshold type who, being the boundary between the investing and non-investing types, is uncertain about the aggregate investment. A key to the solution of static global games is that the belief held by the threshold type is very simple: She believes that the aggregate investment is distributed uniformly across all feasible investment levels. To emphasize the connection to Laplace's principle of insufficient reason, Morris and Shin (2003) dub such a belief Laplacian. In this paper we generalize the Laplacian property to dynamic environments.
Because of their tractability, static global games are often applied even at the cost of abstracting from dynamic features of the analyzed problem. For example, Morris and Shin (2004) study debt crises as coordination failures arising among a group of creditors. The unique equilibrium of their static global game exhibits inefficient early exits of investors, and thus it is natural to ask whether such exit options should be provided. In this paper we provide a general framework that addresses this very question. Such a question requires a dynamic model because policies affecting the exit option -the liquidity of investment -will also affect the entry decisions.
We study a dynamic coordination game in which players decide whether to invest in a project consisting of an early and a late stage. Players first make a binary investment decision at the beginning of the first stage based on their initial private information. During the first stage players learn additional private information and can reverse the initial decision in between the two stages. More precisely, one of the two available actions, investment or safe action, is irreversible and the other is reversible, which induces an option value to the reversible action. We call the reversibility of the risky investment the exit option and reversibility of the safe action the delay option.
The expected option values are highly endogenous, as they depend on the equilibrium behavior in the second stage. Our main technical insight is that they can be partially characterized by the use of the Laplacian property generalized to dynamic games. We find that the threshold type at the beginning of the game forms an expected option value as if she had a uniform belief about the investment level in the late stage of the project.
We compare the coordination outcome in the dynamic game to a benchmark static game without the reversibility option. Thanks to the generalized Laplacian property, the characterization of the reversibility effects becomes simple. As the Laplacian property holds in both games, we need not worry about the differences in the equilibrium beliefs across the two games and we can evaluate the differences in equilibrium actions based solely on certain simple mechanistic properties of the investment project.
We find that the effect of the option provision depends on an intertemporal payoff structure. We say that payoffs exhibit forward spillovers if production involves inertia, so that the additional profit in the late stage depends not only on the late but also on the early investment level. We say that payoffs exhibit backward spillovers if the profit from investment in the early stage of the project depends not only on the early but also on the late investment level. 1 Using this terminology, the effects are as in Table 1 : the exit option enhances efficient coordination in projects with forward spillovers and hampers efficient coordination in projects with backward spillovers. The delay option has the opposite effects. As a corollary, neither the exit nor the delay option has any effect in projects without both backward and forward spillovers.
payoff spillovers option to backward forward exit delay × more failures fewer failures × fewer failures more failures × × irrelevance result Table 1 : Effect of the reversibility option on the occurrence of coordination failures.
We share a focus on the effects of reversibility options on investment decisions with McDonald and Siegel (1986) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , but we differ in the source of uncertainty. Their work on single-person investment decisions with delay option considers uncertainty coming from exogenous shocks. In our framework, the main source of uncertainty is endogenous and strategic as the players are uncertain about others' actions.
Our paper belongs to a booming literature on dynamic global games. One strand of this literature emphasizes the intertemporal tradeoffs of players facing frictions in an evolving environment (Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner 2001 , Levin 2001 , or Chassang 2009 . A second strand studies public learning in a stable environment and emphasizes equilibrium multiplicity induced by observation of an endogenously chosen public policy (Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2006) , observation of prices (Angeletos and Werning 2006) , or observation of earlier coordination outcomes (Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2007) .
Our paper belongs to yet another stream of dynamic global games literature (Heidhues and Melissas 2006 , Dasgupta 2007 , and Dasgupta, Steiner, and Stewart 2007 in which the environment is fixed, but the reversibility option has a value induced by learning. The learning is private, and hence equilibrium uniqueness may be preserved, which facilitates characterization of the reversibility effects. The generalized Laplacian property described in this paper unifies this characterization across a large class of setups without resorting to specific payoff functions.
One of the dynamic effects studied in the literature but not addressed here is that investment by one player can trigger investment of her fellow players either through signalling or via complementarities; (see Corsetti, et al. 2004 or Hörner 2004 within the global games literature, and Chamley and Gale 1994, Gale 1995, or Gul and Lundholm 1995 outside of the global games literature). Our model abstracts from informational externalities as we assume that the amount of information revealed during coordination is independent of players' actions. Moreover, our players are small and therefore cannot individually trigger investments by others.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model; Section 3 provides an informal overview of the analysis; Section 4 contains the main technical contribution of the paper -it describes the generalized Laplacian property in dynamic games. The Laplacian property holds in monotone strategy profiles, and hence in Section 5 we restrict our attention to global games in which the unique rationalizable strategy is monotone. Section 6 identifies the strategic effects of the reversibility option by comparing equilibria across the dynamic game and the static benchmark. In Section 7 we discuss our modeling assumptions. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Model
We study a dynamic, binary action game, Γ dyn , with one of the two actions being reversible and the other irreversible.
There is a common investment project with two production stages and continuum of players indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each production stage is preceded by agents' investment decisions. Before the first production stage, in round 1, all players simultaneously choose between entering the project and the outside option, a i 1 ∈ {0, 1}. Players who chose the outside option, a i 1 = 0, reach their final node and receive a payoff 0. Players who invested, a i 1 = 1, make a new decision in between the two production stages -in round 2. They choose simultaneously whether to stay in or exit the project, a i 2 ∈ {0, 1}. The payoff for investing and exiting (a i 1 , a i 2 ) = (1, 0), is u 1 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ). The payoff for investing and staying, (a i 1 , a i 2 ) = (1, 1), is u 1 (θ, l 1 , l 2 )+u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ), where θ denotes a payoff parameter also called fundamental, l 1 is the measure of players playing a i 1 = 1 in round 1, and l 2 is the measure of players choosing action 1 in both rounds, a i 1 = a i 2 = 1. Functions u 1 and u 2 are realvalued, defined on the domain {(θ, l 1 , l 2 ) ∈ R×[0, 1]×[0, 1] : l 2 ≤ l 1 }, and continuous in all arguments. 2 The additive payoff structure is without loss of generality and facilitates the formulation of assumptions that we impose on the model below. We assume throughout the paper that indifferent types always choose action 1. This specification does not change the best response structure and its only purpose is to ensure clarity of exposition.
For the sake of concreteness we assigned the risky action 1 to be reversible and the safe action to be irreversible. The analysis can be easily extended to a mirror setup with the reversibility of actions switched (see section 7). Following the global games literature, we assume heterogeneity in players' private information. Nature draws the (common) fundamental θ from an improper uniform distribution on R. 3 At the beginning of round t = 1, 2 player i observes a private signal
across players, independent of θ and distributed according to a continuous joint distribution with a compact convex support H. To illustrate the generalized Laplacian property in full generality, the errors are not required to be independent across rounds; errors independent across time are a special case of the setup. We assume no aggregate uncertainty about the realization of the errors -the realized population of errors is identical to their joint density. In Section 7 we discuss the role of the uniform prior and argue that in the limit of precise signals our results remain valid under a non-uniform prior. Bold letter x i = (x i 1 , x i 2 ) denotes the type (signal pair) of player i. The type set is
it is the union of all diagonal translations of the error support H scaled by σ, as illustrated on Figure 2 . We use the usual incomplete product order ≤ to compare the types. A pure strategy 4 is a pair of functions s = (s 1 , s 2 ) with s 1 : R → {0, 1}, s 2 : X → {0, 1}. Abusing terminology and notation, we also call signal x i 1 in round 1 a type, and action rule s 1 (x i 1 ) in round 1 a strategy. Opponents' actions are unobserved, but as discussed in Section 7, we can reinterpret the exogenous signals x i 2 in round 2 in terms of social learning. Our main applied result characterizes the effect of the reversibility option on the coordination outcome. To that end we compare the above dynamic game Γ dyn with a benchmark static game Γ st which differs from Γ dyn only in the lack of the reversibility option: each player can move only in round 1; once a player invests in round 1, she must automatically stay in the project in round 2 (see Figure 1 for a comparison of the games). To facilitate comparison with the dynamic game, we keep the lower index 1 when describing the signal x i 1 or strategy s 1 (x i 1 ) in the static game despite it having only one non-trivial round.
Overview of the Argument
Our central goal is to compare investment across the static and dynamic game. As both games are dominance solvable under certain payoff assumptions, we compare conditions for the rationalizability of investment across the two games. Morris and Shin (2003) construct the rationalizability conditions in the static global game in two steps: First they show that under any symmetric monotone strategy profile with threshold x * 1 , the threshold type x * 1 has Laplacian belief about the investment level i.e., l|x * 1 is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The second step characterizes the rationalizability of each of the actions. For any value of x * 1 , let m st (x * 1 ) be the payoff for investing expected by the threshold type x * 1 under the symmetric monotone profile in which all players use the threshold x * 1 . Then action 1/0 is the unique rationalizable action at type x 1 in Γ st if and only if m st (x 1 ) is positive/negative. Thanks to the Laplacian property, the payoff expectation m st (·) is a simple object -the threshold type has a uniform belief about l.
Our analysis of the dynamic game follows the above two-steps structure as well. The value added lies primarily in our first step in which we show that the Laplacian property generalizes to the dynamic game. We examine the expectation of a threshold type x * 1 in round 1 under a monotone strategy s = (s 1 , s 2 ) where s 1 has the threshold x * 1 , and s 2 is a symmetric monotone equilibrium strategy in the continuation game of round 2. We introduce function m dyn (x * 1 ) = D 1 (x * 1 ) + D 2 (x * 1 ) that denotes the incentive to invest in round 1 as expected at the threshold signal x * 1 in round 1. It is a sum of the expected profits
for each of the two stages of the project. In the case of the second stage expectation, D 2 , the threshold type x * 1 anticipates her own action s 2 (x i ) optimally chosen in round 2 based on yet unreceived information x i = (x * 1 , x i 2 ). Thus D 2 is the value of the option to stay in the project.
Expressing D 1 is simple because, exactly as in the static game, the threshold type x * 1 has a uniform belief about the first stage investment level l 1 . Analysis of the option value D 2 is complex because the threshold type x * 1 in round 1 has to anticipate her future action, which is contingent on her future information, and correlated with others' future actions. Our central finding is that the threshold type x * 1 in round 1, taking into account her reversibility option in round 2, forms expectation D 2 as if she had not had the reversibility option and believed that l 2 was uniform on [0, 1]:
In the second step, we examine the rationalizability of actions. Again, action 1/0 is rationalizable at x 1 in round 1 of Γ dyn if and only if m dyn (x 1 ) is positive/negative. As in the static case, the Laplacian property and the rationalizability condition enrich each other in the dynamic game because both D 1 (x 1 ) and D 2 (x 1 ) are formed based on the uniform belief about l 1 and l 2 respectively. Using this we compare the investment behavior across the two games. The comparison is simple because, thanks to the Laplacian property, the functions m st (x 1 ) and m dyn (x 1 ) are, roughly speaking, based on identical beliefs about l t across the two games. Under such identical beliefs, the threshold expectations can be compared across the two games based solely on certain qualitative characteristics of the project.
The Laplacian Property
In this section, we assume that the strategy profile is symmetric and monotone and we analyze the payoff expectations of the threshold type. First, we review the Laplacian property in the static game as described in Morris and Shin (2003) . Then, we generalize the Laplacian property to the dynamic game. Later on, in Section 5, we impose additional assumptions on the primitives of the model that assure that the Laplacian property is applicable. We specify payoff assumption under which both games are dominance solvable and the unique equilibrium is a symmetric monotone strategy profile.
Laplacian Belief in the Static Game
Let s 1 (x i 1 ) be a symmetric monotone strategy profile with threshold x * 1 , and let L = [x * 1 , +∞) be the set of investing types. The strategy profile induces l(θ), specifying aggregate investment as a non-decreasing function of realized θ. As there is no aggregate uncertainty, l(θ) equals the probability that type of any particular player j belongs to L,
The following theorem describes the Laplacian property in the static game Γ st : The theorem holds under three assumptions on the information structure. Errors η i 1 are independent across players and independent of θ, and the players hold uninformative prior belief about θ. The intuition is as follows. Threshold type x * 1 , being a boundary between the investing and non-investing types, is uncertain about the realized proportions of players on the each side of the boundary. The proportions are determined by the rank of her signal x * 1 within the realized population of signals. The only information she receives is her own signal, which is entirely uninformative about her rank.
Laplacian Expectations in the Dynamic Game
We now examine the expected payoff of the threshold type in round 1 of the dynamic game. We fix a symmetric monotone strategy profile s, and denote the threshold signal in round 1 again by x * 1 . We assume that sufficiently high types invest in both rounds; there exists (x 1 , x 2 ) such that s 1 (x 1 ) = s 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 1 for all (x 1 , x 2 ) > (x 1 , x 2 ). This will be guaranteed by the payoff assumptions introduced below. We let L 1 and L 2 denote the sets of types that invest in the first and in both rounds, respectively. Strategy s induces a pair of investment profiles l t (θ) = Pr(x j ∈ L t | θ) that specify the investment levels in round t = 1, 2 for each value of the realized fundamental θ. Both l 1 (θ) and l 2 (θ) are nondecreasing and their inverse functions are well-defined on the domain (0, 1). Out of the triple of variables θ, l 1 , l 2 we can choose any one as the independent one and express the remaining two variables as its non-decreasing functions. We abuse notation by writing θ(l t ), l 1 (l 2 ), or l 2 (l 1 ) instead of introducing new symbols for the functional forms.
We let
and write D t for the expected payoff for stage t = 1, 2 of the project as expected in round 1 by the threshold type x * 1 :
where in the case of D 2 , player in round 1 anticipates her own behavior s 2 (x i ) which is contingent on the yet unreceived signal x i 2 . Thus, D 2 is the expected value of the option to participate in the second stage. The expectations are computed under the fixed profile s, which we omit from the notation. Also note that the random variables θ, l 1 , and l 2 are mutually dependent through the relations specified above. Terms D 1 and D 2 are important for the equilibrium analysis below because the equilibrium threshold type x * 1 can be found from the indifference condition
We consider a monotone symmetric strategy profile which is optimal in round 2,
, but not necessarily in round 1. That is, constraining players to a possibly non-equilibrium threshold x * 1 in round 1, we examine equilibrium of the continuation game.
The following theorem is the central technical insight of the paper. It states that the threshold type x * 1 in round 1 forms expectations D t as if she had a uniform belief over l 1 and l 2 : Theorem 2 (Generalized Laplacian Property). Consider a monotone strategy s that is optimal in round 2. Threshold type x * 1 forms payoff expectations in round 1 as if she had a uniform belief about l 1 and l 2 , respectively:
Expression for D 1 is immediate because the threshold type x * 1 in round 1 of Γ dyn indeed has a uniform belief about l 1 , exactly as she had in the static case. The characterization of D 2 is not immediate. To see this let us discuss how the threshold type x * 1 computes the option value D 2 . She first needs to compute the probability that she stays in the project upon receiving x i 2 and then needs to form a belief about l 2 conditional on staying. Such a conditional belief is complicated as it reflects both the error distributions and the properties of the strategy profile. The advantage of Theorem 2 is that it circumvents the computation of such beliefs. The simple integral in (4) based on the uniform distribution of l 2 instead of the complicated conditional distribution gives the correct value of D 2 . The error distributions and the strategy profile still influence D 2 but they are summarized by the functions θ(l 2 ) and l 1 (l 2 ) that relate the fundamental and the investment levels in rounds 1 and 2. Theorem 2 is useful despite that the functions θ(l 2 ), l 1 (l 2 ) may be complex, because, as we show below, the theorem allows us to make predictions independent of the details of the mappings between θ, l 1 and l 2 .
We prove Theorem 2 in two auxiliary lemmas. In Lemma 1 we transform the player's advantage arising from the option into an advantage arising from modified information. Transforming the analytical problem arising from our dynamic structure into a static problem with the modified information is useful: Known results on static global games do not accommodate our dynamic setup, but they are robust with respect to the specification of information structure. Indeed, in Lemma 2 we recognize that the transformed problem is a static problem in which the known static Laplacian property holds.
Before formulating the lemmas, we amend the notation. Recall that set L 1 of types investing in round 1 is {x ∈ X : x 1 ≥ x * 1 }. Therefore the information of a player who received signal x * 1 in round 1 is equivalent to the information that her type x belongs to boundary ∂L 1 . 5 Using ∂L 1 = {x ∈ X : x 1 = x * 1 }, we can rewrite D 1 and D 2 as
In general we write E[ξ|S] for the expectation of a random variable ξ conditional on the event that type x i belongs to a set S. The new notation, though it is more complex, will highlight similarities between the analysis of D 1 and D 2 .
The first auxiliary lemma states that D 2 satisfies a formula analogous to the definition of D 1 : Lemma 1. If strategy s is monotone and optimal in round 2 then
The left-hand side constitutes the definition of our object of interest, D 2 , the expected continuation payoff of a player having the option to exit or stay in the project. The right-hand side expresses D 2 without the computational intricacies caused by the option. It corresponds to the case where the player is committed to invest in round 2, but her information is modified. Instead of knowing that her type x lies in ∂L 1 , she knows that x ∈ ∂L 2 . Lemma 1 states that the change in information precisely compensates for the lost option. The idea behind Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 3 . The types (x * 1 , x 2 ) do or do not invest in round 2 depending on whether their signal x i 2 in round 2 exceeds a critical signal x * 2 . The investing types -those on ∂L 1 above x * 2 -also belong to the boundary ∂L 2 . The types who exit -those on ∂L 1 below x * 2 -receive 0 second stage payoff. Types on ∂L 2 to the right and below of x * 2 who invest in round 2 also receive expected payoff U 2 (x) = 0 because they satisfy the indifference condition in round 2. We show that, when computing the expectation on the left-hand side of (5), we can replace the exiting types at ∂L 1 below x * 2 with the investing but indifferent types on ∂L 2 to the right of x * 2 . Thus, we have arrived at the expectation conditional on ∂L 2 of a player who never exits in round 2, which is the right-hand side of (5).
The second auxiliary lemma is a direct extension of the static Laplacian property. Indeed, for t = 1 Lemma 2 coincides with the static case in Theorem 1. Thus the reader may focus on the case t = 2. Figure 4 : Lemma 2. Information that a player's type is on the boundary of L 2 is uninformative of the realized proportion of players above the boundary.
Recall the intuition from the static game: Threshold type x * 1 constitutes the boundary ∂L of the investing types and does not know the proportion of players with their types above the boundary. In the dynamic case, the condition in l 2 |∂L 2 is again the boundary of types investing in the second round 2. Again, the information that the player's type is somewhere on the boundary ∂L 2 turns out to be entirely uninformative of the realized proportion l 2 of players above the boundary. To show this formally, we reduce the dimensionality of the problem in the proof. We introduce diagonal translations of ∂L 2 and label them in a monotonic way as in Figure 4 . Let us call the labels virtual one-dimensional signalsx i , and let the label associated with ∂L 2 bex * . Belief l 2 |∂L 2 is then Pr (x j ≥x * |x * ), for which the static Laplacian property applies.
Proof of Theorem 2. Using Lemma 1,
Combined, this implies the Laplacian property expressed in (4).
Rationalizable Behavior
We now impose payoff restrictions common in the global games literature under which both the static and the dynamic game become dominance solvable. Later on, we use the Laplacian property to partially characterize the unique rationalizable strategy profile.
A1 Strict State Monotonicity: Both u 1 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) and u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) are strictly increasing in θ.
A2 Weak Action Monotonicity: Both u 1 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) and u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) are non-decreasing in l 1 and l 2 .
A3 Dominance Regions:
A3a (lower and upper dominance regions in the static game): There exist θ and θ such that u 1 (θ, l 1 , l 2 )+u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) < 0 for all θ < θ, and all l 1 , l 2 ∈ [0, 1],
A3b (lower dominance region in round 1): There exists θ 1 such that u 1 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) < 0 for all θ < θ 1 and all l 1 , l 2 ∈ [0, 1], l 2 ≤ l 1 .
A3c (upper dominance region in round 2): There exist θ 2 such that u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) > 0 for all θ > θ 2 and all l 1 , l 2 ∈ [0, 1], l 2 ≤ l 1 .
Based on A1, we can interpret θ as a common quality of the project. Assumption A2 imposes strategic complementarities; it assures that investing by any player in any round increases the incentive to invest for other players in both rounds. Assumptions A3a-A3c assume the existence of dominance regions. They assure that in both stages of the dynamic game and in the static game, players with very high signals participate in the project and those with very low signals do not participate. Assumption A3a assumes both dominance regions for the static game directly. In the dynamic game, players with very high signals invest in round 1 under A3a, and so we only need to assure by A3b that those with very low signals do not invest. Similarly, in A3c we need to assume only the upper dominance region in round 2, because players with very low second signals do not participate in the second stage as they have not invested already in round 1 under A3b.
Before proceeding to rationalizability in the dynamic game, we first review the result in Morris and Shin (2003) on rationalizability in the static game. For each x * 1 , we consider a symmetric monotone strategy profile with the threshold equal to x * 1 and define
as the expectation of the threshold type. Function m st is continuous, and strictly monotone under A1, and hence it has a unique root. The following proposition characterizes the unique rationalizable action at each signal x 1 (apart from the root). For the proof, see Proposition 2.1 in Morris and Shin (2003) .
We now move to the dynamic setup. Our concept of rationalizability follows Pearce (1984); we do not, however, face complications that generally arise in dynamic games. Actions are unobservable in our game, and hence no conjectures about the opponents' strategies are ever refuted in the progress of play. A simple definition of rationalizability particularly tailored to our game is as follows. Strategy profile is a mapping Σ(i) specifying strategy s i for each player i. The best response set
We write S k for the set of strategies s that are not eliminated after k iterations. That is, we let S 0 denote the set of all strategies, and define S k recursively for k = 1, 2, . . . :
The set of rationalizable actions at signal x 1 in round 1 is the set of actions a 1 for which there exists (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S * so that s 1 (x 1 ) = a 1 . The set of rationalizable actions at type x in round 2 is the set of actions a 2 for which there exists (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S * so that s 2 (x) = a 2 .
To simplify the formulation of results our definition of rationalizability requires that type (x 1 , x 2 ) chooses best response in round 2 in each iteration even if she has not invested in round 1, s 1 (x 1 ) = 0. This does not influence the set of rationalizable actions "on the equilibrium path" because in our model s 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) of a type who has chosen not to invest in round 1, s 1 (x 1 ) = 0, has no payoff or informational consequences to any player.
Similar to the function m st , we define
to be the payoff expectation of the threshold type x * 1 in round 1 of the dynamic game under a symmetric strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ) where s 1 is a threshold strategy with the threshold x * 1 . The continuation strategy s 2 is specified as an equilibrium strategy in the continuation game Γ 2 (x * 1 ) induced from Γ dyn by the first round threshold x * 1 . The game Γ 2 (x * 1 ) is a static Bayesian game, as players are assumed to use s 1 in round 1 and only have a choice about s 2 (x i ). The following lemma establishes that Γ 2 (x * 1 ) is dominance solvable and hence m dyn is uniquely defined. (See appendix A.2 for discussion of the rationalizability in game Γ 2 (x * 1 ).)
Lemma 3. For each x * 1 , the continuation game Γ 2 (x * 1 ) has a unique rationalizable strategy s 2 , which is monotone and attains 1 for sufficiently high types x.
Note that the lemma assures that s 2 satisfies all requirements needed for the generalized Laplacian property; s 2 is monotone, optimal in round 2, and attains 1 for sufficiently high types.
Lemma 4. Function m dyn (x 1 ) is uniquely defined, strictly increasing, and attains both positive and negative values.
The second lemma implies that equation m dyn (x 1 ) = 0 has a unique solution which we denote by x * * 1 . The following proposition states that the dynamic game Γ dyn is dominance solvable. (ii) The unique rationalizable strategy s 2 in round 2 of Γ dyn equals the unique rationalizable strategy in the game Γ 2 (x * * 1 ).
The proof is based on the usual contagion argument. Action 1 is dominant in round 1 in the upper dominance region. Now, suppose 1 is dominant above some x 1 . Then m dyn (x 1 ) is a lower bound for payoff expectation of the type x 1 in round 1. Hence, if m dyn (x 1 ) > 0 then, by continuity argument, action 1 is also serially dominant in a left neighborhood of x 1 . The set of the signals at which action 1 is established to be serially dominant in round 1 can be iteratively expanded as long as m dyn (x 1 ) > 0. Symmetric argument applies for action 0.
Strategic Effects of Reversibility
In this section we return to our applied question. We compare rationalizable behavior across the dynamic and the static game and characterize the effects of the reversibility option on the coordination outcome. We identify conditions under which the option hampers or enhances coordination on risky investment.
From the previous section we know that we need to compare functions m st and m dyn . For instance, if m dyn (x 1 ) ≥ m st (x 1 ) then investment is rationalizable at x 1 in the static game only if it is rationalizable in round 1 of the dynamic game. Comparison of the two functions is facilitated by the Laplacian property; it assures that the expectations of the threshold types are based on uniform beliefs in both games.
We conduct such comparison in parts. Similar to
is the expectation of the threshold type x * 1 in the static game. Thanks to the Laplacian property, S t and D t can be unambiguously compared:
For each x 1 ∈ R the following inequalities hold:
Proof. (i) Using the Laplacian property we can write both sides as expectations based on a uniform belief about l 1 :
Note that the two integrals differ only in the third argument of u 1 . The inequality follows from the monotonicity of u 1 and from the fact that l 1 ≥ l 2 .
(ii) Similarly, we can write both sides as expectations based on uniform belief about l 2 :
In this case the two integrals differ in the first and second argument of u 2 . We again use the inequality l 2 ≤ l 1 (l 2 ) and the monotonicity of u 2 . But in this case, we also need to distinguish between functions θ st (l 2 ) and θ dyn (l 2 ) which are defined as inverse functions to l st (θ) and l dyn 2 (θ). 6 Investment levels l st (θ) and l dyn 2 (θ) in stage 2 generally differ across the static and the dynamic game, and thus the inverse functions differ too. Furthermore, θ st (l 2 ) ≤ θ dyn (l 2 ) because both l st (θ) and l dyn 2 (θ) are increasing and because l st (θ) = l dym 1 (θ) ≥ l dyn 2 (θ) for all θ, so the opposite inequality holds for the inverse functions. (Note that this problem does not arise in the proof of inequality (i) as for fixed threshold x 1 , the first-round investments in the static and the dynamic game are the same, i.e., l st (θ) = l dyn 1 (θ).)
We call inequalities (i) and (ii) the first and the second stage effects. The two effects have opposite signs and therefore a comparison of m st and m dyn is possible only if we add further structure to the model:
We say that the payoffs do not exhibit 1. backward spillovers if u 1 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) does not depend on l 2 .
2. forward spillovers if u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) does not depend on l 1 . Absence of either backward or forward spillovers allows us to characterize the strategic effect of reversibility. Let us first go through the argument informally. Assume that payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers. Then the first stage effect disappears (for simplicity we omit the third argument of u 1 ),
and thus m st (x 1 ) ≤ m dyn (x 1 ) by the second stage effect. Therefore, in the absence of backward spillovers, the exit option enhances investment: investing is rationalizable in the dynamic game on a larger set of first-round signals x 1 than in the static game. Similarly, if payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers, and under an additional condition, the second stage effect disappears,
when the errors are small, so x 1 ≈ θ. Then the exit option hampers investment.
We will formalize these observations in the limit of precise signals. In such a limit, the fundamental uncertainty becomes negligible, x 1 ≈ θ, and the analysis can focus on the strategic uncertainty, which remains large. Formally, we examine sequences of the static and the dynamic games with varying scale of noise σ. The corresponding games are denoted by Γ st (σ) or Γ dyn (σ), whereas Γ st , Γ dyn without the argument denote in this section whole classes of games (Γ(σ)) σ . We now introduce new terminology that describes local rationalizable behavior in the limit of precise signals.
Definition 4. We say that action history h ∈ {0, 10, 11} is selected at θ in Γ st , respectively in Γ dyn if there exists σ > 0 such that for all σ ∈ (0, σ] all players in Γ st (σ), respectively in Γ dyn (σ), reach action history h whenever Nature draws the fundamental θ and all players play according to rationalizable strategies. Naturally, only action histories 0 or 11 can be selected in the static game.
The next definition will allow us to focus on cases in which the second-round behavior is non-trivial.
Definition 5. We say that strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ in round 2 if To see that the opposite inequality trivially rules out investment in round 2, assume that 1 0 u 2 (θ, 1, l 2 )dl 2 < 0. To make the second stage as attractive as possible, suppose that the first stage of the project is compulsory, l 1 = 1. Given the assumed inequality, the Laplacian action in the second stage would be 0 at θ and hence 0 would be selected in round 2 at θ. In such cases, when strategic uncertainty does not permit investment in round 2, the dynamic game essentially simplifies into a static game consisting of only the first round. As analysis of the option effect then reduces to a simple comparison of two static global games, we omit those cases.
For technical reasons we impose two additional assumptions:
A4 Strict Action Monotonicity in Round 2: u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) strictly increases in l 2 .
A5 Restriction on Error Distributions
The restricted error structure is natural. As before, x i 2 = θ + ση i 2 , and x i 1 = θ + ση i 1 , but A5 additionally ensures that x i 1 is an uninformative coarsening of x i 2 . This is because
Thus, x i 2 is sufficient statistics of (x i 1 , x i 2 ) for θ. Such information structure has been used in e.g. Heidhues and Melissas (2006) or Dasgupta (2007) . The assumption implies that player i's optimal action in round 2 depends only on x i 2 and not on x i 1 . Thus the strategy in round 2 can also be described by a single threshold that does not depend on the signal in round 1.
We are now ready to state the main applied results. In the absence of backward spillovers the first stage effect disappears and, based on the second stage effect only, the exit option enhances investment. The effect is reversed when payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers. Proposition 3. If payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers and strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ in round 2 then reversibility enhances investment:
(i) If action history 11 is selected at θ in Γ st then 11 is selected at θ in Γ dyn .
(ii) If 0 is selected at θ in Γ dyn then 0 is selected at θ in Γ st . Proposition 4. If payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers and strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ in round 2 then reversibility hampers investment:
(i) If action history 11 is selected at θ in Γ dyn then 11 is selected at θ in Γ st .
(ii) If 0 is selected at θ in Γ st then 0 is selected at θ in Γ dyn .
A simple corollary of the last two propositions is that in the absence of both spillovers, the provision of the exit option does not change the coordination outcome. 
Example
Let us illustrate the results on particular payoffs
The illustrative payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers and so, in accordance with Proposition 3, the exit option enhances investment. Proposition 3 (as well as Proposition 4) is based on a comparison of functions m * st and m * dyn . 7 For illustrative purposes we depict the two functions in Figure 5 under a particular specification of error distributions. We omit the details of the computation because, as we have shown, the comparison of the two functions is possible without explicitly deriving the two functions. 8 Indeed, m * dyn (x 1 ) ≥ m * st (x 1 ) and hence investing is rationalizable on a larger set of signals x 1 in the dynamic than in the static game.
Moreover, for this specification, it is possible to verify that strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ in round 2 for all θ above the root of m dyn . We show in appendix (Lemma 9) that in such a case entry followed by exit is never selected in the dynamic game. For all θ above the root of m dyn investing and staying in the project is selected, while for θ below the root not investing is selected.
While, in the limit of precise signals, the exits almost never happen in the example from the ex ante perspective, the exit option continues to have large strategic consequences. To reconcile this, recall that types in a vanishing neighborhood of the root do exercise the exit option, because they suffer from large strategic uncertainty. While such 7 By m * st (x 1 ) and m * dyn (x 1 ) we denote the limit values of m st (x 1 ) and m dyn (x 1 ) when σ → 0 + (see Appendix for details). 8 The computation is based on the second-round indifference condition. The two indifference conditions fully specify the equilibrium strategy profile, and hence also the mappings between θ, l 1 and l 2 . The mappings, together with the Laplacian property, fully specify m * st and m * dyn . See the working paper version (Kováč and Steiner 2008) for details. types are rare, they have a large impact because the central equilibrium condition -the indifference condition -is imposed on the threshold type.
Discussion of the setup
Let us briefly discuss the main modeling assumptions.
First, the uninformative prior together with the independence of errors with respect to θ imply that conditional distributions are invariant to diagonal translations on the type space, i.e.,
This translation invariance, which drives the Laplacian property, would be distorted by an informative prior. However, in the limit of small noise, as σ → 0 + , any prior becomes approximately uninformative, and hence our results remain approximately valid under any prior, as long as the signals are sufficiently precise.
Second, we assumed that the value of the fundamental θ is fixed throughout the game. We conjecture that the generalized Laplacian property would remain valid in a randomly evolving environment. We abstract from the fluctuations in θ because learning alone suffices to induce positive value to the reversibility option, and the arguments behind the generalized Laplacian property are orthogonal to the fluctuations.
Third, let us review a modeling approach often used in dynamic global games that provides micro-foundations to the exogenous signal in round 2 in terms of social learning. 9 In our specification players in round 2 receive additional information about θ, whereas the early investment level l 1 is unobserved. Obviously, the signal x i 2 provides in equilibrium indirect information about l 1 as well. If all players use a monotone strategy with threshold x * 1 in round 1, then θ and l 1 are related by the mapping l 1 = 1 − F 1
, where F 1 is the c.d.f. of the first-round error η i 1 . In fact, we can reverse the perspective and formulate an alternative model in which the primary source of information in round 2 is a noisy observation of l 1 and players learn about θ only indirectly. Assume in this alternative model that players in round 1 observe fundamental-based signal x i 1 = θ + ση i 1 as above, but instead of the round 2 signal x i 2 = θ + ση i 2 , players observe a noisy aggregate statistic of the round 1 actions. The following specification is used for tractability reasons in the literature:
In a symmetric monotone equilibrium, the observation of y i turns out to be equivalent to the observation of x i 2 = θ + ση i 2 because a player observing y i can compute x i 2 in the equilibrium. Hence, the set of symmetric monotone equilibria coincides across our model with fundamental-based learning and the alternative model with social-based learning. Our model with fundamental-based learning has a unique equilibrium (under the assumptions from Section 5) which is monotone and symmetric, and so it remains a unique equilibrium within the class of monotone symmetric equilibria in the model with social learning. Last, we assumed that investment is reversible and that the safe action is irreversible. This choice is arbitrary, and we also examined a variant of the dynamic game in which the investing is irreversible, whereas not investing is reversible -players may delay investment (see Figure 6 ). As the two variants of the dynamic game can be mapped to each other by a careful relabeling of the actions, we formulated the whole analysis only in terms of the first variant. However, the studied effects turn out to have opposite signs across the two games. To understand why, recall that the effects in the game with the exit option were driven by inequalities l 2 ≤ l 1 . The opposite inequality l 2 ≥ l 1 holds in the variant with the delay option as players who have not invested in round 1 can join the project in round 2. For this reason the first-and second-stage effects attain opposite signs. See Table 1 for a summary and comparison.
Conclusion
Economically relevant coordination problems are rarely static. Typically, they are dynamic processes in which economic agents can postpone irreversible decisions in order to acquire additional information. We developed a modeling framework that incorporates learning and (ir)reversibility without compromising analytical tractability. The framework allows for a qualitative assessment of the reversibility effects based solely on two features observable by an outside modeler. The first relevant feature is the (ir)reversibility of actions available to the economic agents, and the second feature is the structure of the intertemporal payoff spillovers in between different stages of the coordination process. Based on these two features, the modeler or a policy maker can assess the effects of the reversibility option as summarized in Table 1 on page 3.
The applicability of this dynamic framework can be demonstrated on the economic problem of creditors discussed in the introduction. The problem studied in Morris and Shin (2004) consisted of an investment project with reversible investment and an irreversible safe action, which conforms to the left column in Table 1 . It is conceivable that the investment project exhibits forward payoff spillovers because a higher level of investment in the early stage may ceteris paribus increase profits in the late stage of the project due to inertia in the production process. On the contrary, backward payoff spillovers are unlikely because the instantaneous profit from the first stage is presumably not causally influenced by the investment level in the later stage. This structure of payoff spillovers corresponds to the second row of Table 1 and thus the provision of an exit option enhances efficient coordination in this case. Although, as found by Morris and Shin, the exit option could lead in the interim stage of the project to inefficient runs, this is more than offset by the valuable flexibility provided by the option. The opposite effect arises if the structure of the payoff spillovers is preserved but, instead of the option to reverse the investment, players have the option to delay (Heidhues and Melissas 2006, Section 3.2 falls into this category). The provision of a delay option hampers efficient coordination in this case.
In other cases, the structure of the payoff spillovers may differ. In some applications of regime change games, 10 the success of the attack and the payoffs for participation in the early and late wave of the attack depend only on the final size of the attack l 2 (as assumed in Dasgupta 2007) . In such cases the payoffs exhibit backward but no forward spillovers, the delay option enhances and the exit option hampers efficient coordination.
We limited our analysis to setups with two rounds and one reversible action. In the working version of the paper (Kováč and Steiner 2008) we sketch an extension of the generalized Laplacian property to setups with many rounds and many options. Full generality of the Laplacian property and evaluation of the strategic consequences of reversibility options in general environments remains an opportunity for future research.
A Proofs
We first introduce additional useful notation describing error distributions. The supports of the marginal distributions of η i t are, without loss of generality, 11 assumed to be symmetric intervals [−h t , h t ] where h t is a positive constant (t = 1, 2). The joint density and the c.d.f. of the error pair (η 1 , η 2 ) are denoted f and F , respectively. The marginal c.d.f. of η i t is denoted F t (for t = 1, 2) . In addition, we denote η i 
A.1 Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. For convenience, we let σ = 1 in the proof. Let x * 2 = inf{x 2 ∈ [x * 1 + η ∆ , x * 1 + η ∆ ] : s 2 (x * 1 , x 2 ) = 1} with a convention that x * 2 = x * 1 + η ∆ if no type in ∂L 1 invests in round 2. We denote η * ∆ = x * 2 − x * 1 . We prove (5) by showing that both its left-and right-hand side are equal to
In the proof we make use of the fact that η i ∆ is independent of events ∂L 1 and ∂L 2 , and therefore the conditional distribution of η i ∆ |∂L t equals the unconditional distribution of η ∆ with c.d.f. F ∆ . This independence will be demonstrated at the end of the proof.
The left-hand side of (5) equals (9) because s 2 (x * 1 , x * 1 +η ∆ ) = 0 for η ∆ < η * ∆ , s 2 (x * 1 , x * 1 + η ∆ ) = 1 for η ∆ > η * ∆ , and c.d.f. of η ∆ |∂L 1 is F ∆ .
Let us now turn to the right-hand side of (5) . By the law of iterated expectations, we can write it as
Next, for each value of η ∆ ∈ [η ∆ , η ∆ ], define x(η ∆ ) as the intersection of the boundary ∂L 2 and line x 2 = x 1 + η ∆ . (We do not introduce new symbol for the function x(·) which is a slight abuse of notation.) The intersection exists and is unique. The existence is assured by the assumption that types above some x invest in both rounds: for sufficiently high x 1 , type (x 1 , x 1 + η ∆ ) exceeds x and then (x 1 , x 1 + η ∆ ) ∈ L 2 . For sufficiently low x 1 , x 1 < x * 1 and then (x 1 ,
The uniqueness follows from the fact that the strategy s is monotone and hence ∂L 2 cannot contain x and x such that x > x .
Using this notation, and the independence of η ∆ from the event ∂L 2 , we can divide
The first integral is identical to the first integral in (9) because if η ∆ < η * ∆ then x(η ∆ ) satisfies the indifference condition in round 2, U 2 (x(η ∆ )) = 0. To see this, note that type
Then, by the monotonicity of s 2 , x(η ∆ ) is in the interior of L 1 for η ∆ < η * ∆ . Thus in any neighborhood of x(η ∆ ) there exist x and x such that s 2 (x ) = 0 and s 2 (x ) = 1. Strategy s 2 (x) is assumed to be optimal in round 2 and hence U 2 (x ) ≤ 0, U 2 (x ) ≥ 0. Then U 2 (x(η ∆ )) = 0 from the continuity of expectations with respect to the signals.
The second integral in (10) is identical to the second integral in (9) because if η ∆ > η * then x(η ∆ ) = (x * 1 , x * 1 + η ∆ ) as the type (x * 1 , x * 1 + η ∆ ) lies on the boundary of L 2 . To see this, notice that s 2 (x * 1 , x * 1 + η ∆ ) = 1 by the definition of η * ∆ ; therefore (x * 1 , x * 1 + η ∆ ) ∈ L 2 . On the other hand, (x * 1 − δ, x * 1 + η ∆ ) / ∈ L 1 ⊇ L 2 for any δ > 0. We now complete the proof by showing that η i 1 , η i 2 , and therefore η i ∆ = η i 2 − η i 1 , are independent of events ∂L 1 and ∂L 2 . Let T d (S) be a translation operator that translates a set S ⊆ X by distance d in the direction of diagonal:
We consider now diagonal translations T d (∂L 2 ) of the boundary ∂L 2 that we call isosignals, as seen in Figure 4 . The uninformative prior and the independence of errors from θ imply that the conditional joint distribution of errors is invariant to diagonal translations:
Hence, by the construction of the isosignals, the distribution of (η i 1 , η i 2 ) | (x i ∈ T d (∂L t )) is identical for each d and thus also equal to the unconditional distribution of (η i 1 , η i 2 ).
Proof of Lemma 2.
For type x ∈ X, let us define d t (x) as such d ∈ R for which x ∈ T d (∂L t ). We can interpretx i t = d t (x i ) as a virtual private signal, andη i t =x i t − θ as a virtual error.
The virtual information structure inherits all three properties that are sufficient for the static Laplacian property (Theorem 1). (i) θ is drawn from the (improper) uniform distribution on R. (ii) The virtual errorsη i t are independent across players. (iii) The virtual errorsη i t are independent of θ. The last two properties hold because, by the construction, the virtual errorη i t can be expressed as a function of (η i 1 , η i 2 ) and the original errors (η i 1 , η i 2 ) satisfy those two properties. From the definition of the virtual signals, eventx i t =x * t = 0 is identical to the event x i ∈ ∂L t and type x i participates in the stage t of the project (i.e., x i ∈ L t ), if and only ifx i t ≥x * t . See Figure 4 for an illustration. Therefore the conditional random variable of our interest, l t (θ) | ∂L t , is identical to
and the last conditional random variable is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] by the static Laplacian property in Theorem 1.
A.2 Proofs for Section 5
The continuation game Γ 2 (x * 1 ) is a static Bayesian game in which players i ∈ [0, 1] observe their types x i ∈ X and simultaneously choose strategy s 2 : X → {0, 1}. The joint distribution of types and of θ is as in the dynamic game. The payoff of type x = (x 1 , x 2 ) choosing action s 2 (x) is u(θ, l 1 (θ), l 2 (θ))s 2 (x) where l 1 (θ), l 2 (θ) are, as before, the first and the second stage investment levels as defined for the dynamic game.
Strategy profile in Γ 2 (x * 1 ) is a mapping Σ 2 (i) specifying strategy s i 2 for each player i. The best response set BR 2 (x, Σ 2 ) ⊆ {0, 1} of type x against profile Σ 2 includes action 1 if E [u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 )|x] ≥ 0 and action 0 if E [u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 )|x] ≤ 0 under Σ 2 . We let S 0 2 denote the set of all strategies, and define S k 2 recursively for k = 1, 2, . . . : Strategy s 2 ∈ S k 2 if and only if s 2 ∈ S k−1 2 and for each type x ∈ X there exists profile Σ 2 such that Σ 2 (i) ∈ S k−1 2 for all players i and s 2 (x) ∈ BR 2 (x, Σ 2 ). The set of rationalizable strategies is S * 2 = k S k 2 . The set of rationalizable actions at type x is the set of actions a 2 for which there exists s 2 ∈ S * 2 so that s 2 (x) = a 2 . Notice that this definition of rationalizability requires that type (x 1 , x 2 ) plays best response in each iteration even if x 1 < x * 1 so that the type would not have invested in round 1 of the dynamic game. This complies with our definition of rationalizability for the dynamic game, where we required best responses off the equilibrium path. As we discussed, this requirement only simplifies exposition and does not influence rationalizable actions on the equilibrium path.
Proof of Lemma 3. For convenience, we let σ = 1 in this proof.
We first construct the largest and smallest rationalizable strategies by the contagion argument and then show that they coincide by an adaptation of the translation argument from Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003) .
In the first step we analyze the maximal and the minimal rationalizable strategy in Γ 2 (x * 1 ). This problem is analyzed in van Zandt and Vives (2007) for general Bayesian games with strategic complementarities, but our problem differs in certain details of the setup, such as continuous vs. discrete set of players, and so we give a direct argument.
For a symmetric strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ), let L 1 = {x 1 ∈ R : s 1 (x 1 ) = 1}, I 2 = {x ∈ X : s 2 (x) = 1}, and defineŨ 2 (x, L 1 , I 2 ) = E[u 2 (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) | x] to be the expected second stage payoff under the profile (s 1 , s 2 ).
Let I 
By induction, all following statements hold: The sets I In the second step, based on the translation argument in Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) , we prove that interiors of the sets I 2 and I 2 are identical. Because the sets are upper contour sets, it suffices to prove that their boundaries are equal; ∂I 2 = ∂I 2 . Let us suppose by contradiction that ∂I 2 = ∂I 2 . Let us first recall notation introduced at the beginning of the Appendix:
In addition, let x : [η ∆ , η ∆ ] → ∂I 2 and x : [η ∆ , η ∆ ] → ∂I 2 denote the intersections of the line x 2 − x 1 = η ∆ with ∂I 2 and ∂I 2 , respectively.
By Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , the largest and the smallest rationalizable strategy each constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in Γ 2 (x * 1 ). Hence, the type x(η ∆ ) must satisfy the indifference condition,Ũ 2 (x(η ∆ ), L 1 (x * 1 ),
Another property of the functions x(η ∆ ), x(η ∆ ) is that x(η ∆ ) ≥ x(η ∆ ) for all η ∆ because the sets I 2 , I 2 are upper contour sets and I 2 ⊆ I 2 . As the last property we note that functions x(η ∆ ), x(η ∆ ) are continuous: take η 0 and x 0 = x(η 0 ) (symmetrically for x) and consider a ball in X with radius r around x 0 . Then x(η) lies in this ball whenever |η − η 0 | < r/2. This is because x 0 + (0, r ) ∈ I 2 and x 0 + (− 3 2 r , − 1 2 r ) / ∈ I 2 when r < r/2, and both these points lie in the ball. Now we define function ζ :
The function ζ is continuous and hence it attains a maximum on the compact set [η ∆ , η ∆ ] at some valueη ∆ . The maximal value ζ(η ∆ ) is strictly positive if and only if the boundaries ∂I 2 and ∂I 2 differ. Let
where T is the translation operator along the diagonal, as defined in the proof of Lemma 1 (T d (S) is translation of a set S by vector (d, d) ).
We now establish two inequalities. By construction, T ζ(η ∆ ) (I 2 ) is a subset of the closure of I 2 and therefore by action monotonicity
for all x ∈ X. Also,
because type x under I 2 = T ζ(η ∆ ) (I 2 ) has identical belief about the aggregate action in round 2 as type x − ζ(η ∆ ) · (1, 1) under I 2 = I 2 , but the belief of the latter about (θ, l 1 ) is stochastically dominated (in the sense of the first order stochastic dominance) by the belief about (θ, l 1 ) of the former type; strict inequality holds because u 2 strictly increases in θ.
Finally, let us consider the type x(η ∆ ) = x(η ∆ ) + ζ(η ∆ ) · (1, 1). The types x(η ∆ ), x(η ∆ ) satisfy the indifference conditions, and hence U (x(η ∆ )) = 0, U (x(η ∆ )) = 0. On one hand, using inequality (11) , U (x(η ∆ )) ≤ U (x(η ∆ )) = 0, but on the other hand, by inequality (12) , U (x(η ∆ )) > U (x(η ∆ )) = 0 which establishes the contradiction.
Additionally, notice that the unique rationalizable strategy s 2 in Γ 2 (x * 1 ) attains 1 for sufficiently high types; the existence of the upper dominance region (by A3c) assures that action 1 is dominant for sufficiently high types in Γ 2 (x * 1 ).
Proof of Lemma 4. We again let σ = 1 in this proof. We obtain m dyn (x * 1 ) > 0 for sufficiently high x * 1 by the existence of the upper dominance region (by A3a), and m dyn (x * 1 ) < 0 for sufficiently low x * 1 by the existence of the lower dominance region (by A3a in combination with A3b).
In the rest of the proof we establish monotonicity. Let us consider L 1 (x) and the sets I (k) 2 (x 1 ) as defined for the continuation game Γ 2 (x 1 ) in the proof of Lemma 3 when all players use strategy with threshold x 1 in round 1. Assume x 1 > x 1 and let d = x 1 − x 1 . We prove by induction that
First, notice that, trivially,
by the strict state monotonicity A1. Second, by the action monotonicity A2 and by the induction assumption, the right hand side is smaller or equal thañ
and, using definition of I (k+1) 2 , we closed the induction step; I
We have established I 2 (x 1 ) ⊇ T x 1 −x 1 (I 2 (x 1 )). Then, D t (x 1 ) > D t (x 1 ) for t = 1, 2 because round 1 belief at signal x 1 about (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) under strategy profile induced by the sets L 1 (x 1 ), I 2 (x 1 ) dominate round 1 belief at signal x 1 about (θ, l 1 , l 2 ) under L 1 (x 1 ), I 2 (x 1 ). The strict inequality follows from the strict state monotonicity A1. Therefore m dyn (x 1 ) = D 1 (x 1 ) + D 2 (x 1 ) is strictly increasing in x 1 .
Proof of Proposition 2. From the existence of the dominance regions in round 1 of the dynamic game 13 , there exists x 1 (x 1 ) such that action 1 (0) is strictly dominant in round 1 for signals x 1 > x 1 (x 1 < x 1 ). Function m dyn (x 1 ) is strictly positive (negative) for
Suppose action 1 is the strict best response in round 1 at signal x 1 under the symmetric profile consisting of the minimal rationalizable strategy s. 14 Then 1 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 at type x 1 because there exists k (dependent on x 1 ) 13 Upper dominance region is implied by A3a and lower dominance region by A3a and A3b. 14 That is, s 1 (x 1 ) equals the minimal rationalizable action at x 1 in round 1, and s 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) equals the minimal rationalizable action at (x 1 , x 2 ) in round 2.
such that action 1 is at x 1 in round 1 the strict best response against s k where s k is the minimal strategy in S k . This holds because s k converges pointwise to s, and therefore the expected payoff at signal x 1 in round 1 under symmetric strategy profile s k converges to the expectation under s. By action monotonicity, A2, if action 1 is at x 1 in round 1 the strict best response against s k then it is the strict best response against any strategy profile Σ with Σ(i) ∈ S k for all i.
Suppose next that there exists x 1 such that m dyn (x 1 ) > 0 and action 1 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 for all x 1 ≥ x 1 . Then the expected payoff for playing 1 in round 1 on signal x 1 against the minimal rationalizable strategy s is at least m dyn (x 1 ) > 0. The payoff expectation is continuous in the signal, and hence there exists x 1 < x 1 such that action 1 is the strict best response in round 1 against s at all signals x 1 ≥ x 1 . Hence action 1 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 for all x 1 ≥ x 1 . Iterating this argument, action 1 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 at all x 1 such that m dyn (x 1 ) > 0. Symmetric argument establishes that action 0 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 at all x 1 such that m dyn (x 1 ) < 0.
We have established that each serially undominated strategy s = (s 1 , s 2 ) prescribes to play according to the threshold strategy s 1 with the threshold x * * 1 in round 1. Then s 2 must be the unique serially undominated in the continuation game Γ 2 (x * * 1 ) by Lemma 3.
A.3 Auxiliary Results for Section 6
Before proving Propositions 3 and 4 we formulate and prove Lemmas 6, 7, 8 and 9 on the limiting behavior of the static and dynamic games when σ → 0 + . In the following we will assume that Assumptions A4 (strict action monotonicity in round 2) and A5 (restriction on error distributions) hold in addition to the previous Assumptions A1-A3. Lemma 6. The limit m * dyn (x 1 ) = lim σ→0 + m dyn (x 1 ; σ) exists, is continuous and strictly increasing in x 1 .
Proof of Lemma 6. First, let us introduce additional notation. LetF (z 1 , z 2 ) = Pr(η i 1 ≥ z 1 and η i 2 ≥ z 2 ) denote the complementary cumulative distribution function of (η i 1 , η i 2 ). If η i 2 and η i ∆ are independent, the set H is a parallelogram and η ∆ = −η ∆ = h 1 − h 2 . Further note that, as x i 2 is sufficient statistic, player i's decision in round 2 depends only on x i 2 and not on x i 1 . Thus, s 2 (x i 2 ) is a monotone function R → {0, 1} with a threshold denoted by x * 2 . Let us also denote η * = x * 2 −x 1 σ . Moreover, for the purpose of this proof we need more precise but more complex notation describing mappings between θ, l 1 and l 2 . Let ϑ t (l t ; x 1 , σ) be the inverse function of l t (θ; x 1 , σ) with respect to θ. Omitting dependence on x 1 and σ, let λ t (l −t ) = l t (ϑ −t (l −t )) denote investment level l t as a function of l −t .
Let us divide the proof into three cases depending on the value of x 1 . tion θ = x 1 − σ(a 2 − η * ), the indifference condition can be written as
Observe that for σ > 0: J(η; σ) is strictly increasing and continuous in η and due to the existence of dominance regions, it attains both positive and negative values. Thus, for every σ > 0 there exists unique η = η * (σ) such that J(η; σ) = 0. For σ = 0: J(η; 0) is strictly increasing in η as well, by strict monotonicity of u 2 in l 2 . Therefore, the equation J(η; 0) = 0 has at most one solution.
Now, for η = −(h 1 + h 2 ) and for all a 2 ≥ −h 2 , we haveF (a 2 − η, −h 2 ) =F (a 2 − η, a 2 ) = 0. Moreover, for η = h 1 + h 2 and a 2 ≤ h 2 , we haveF (a 2 − η, −h 2 ) = 1 and F (a 2 −η, a 2 ) = Pr(η i 2 ≥ a 2 ) = 1−F 2 (a 2 ), where F 2 is the cumulative distribution function of η i 2 . Summing up,
Therefore, the equation J(η; 0) = 0 has indeed a unique solution and that solution lies in the interval [−(h 1 + h 2 ), h 1 + h 2 ]; denote it η * * . It follows that η * (σ) → η * * as σ → 0 + and η * * is continuous and decreasing in x 1 , for
Let us now study lim σ→0 + D t (x 1 ; σ), t = 1, 2, for the range of x 1 considered in (c). In order to study the limit lim σ→0 + D 1 (x 1 ; σ), let us first denoteF −1 1 (l) the inverse function toF (z, −h 2 ) with respect to z. Then, ϑ 1 (l 1 ) = x 1 − σF −1 1 (l 1 ) and λ 2 (l 1 ) =F F −1 1 (l 1 ),F −1 1 (l 1 ) + η * (σ) . Both are continuous in x 1 and σ, and in the limit σ → 0 + , we have ϑ 1 (l 1 ) → x 1 and λ 2 (l 1 ) → λ * 2 (l 1 ; x 1 ) =F F −1 1 (l 1 ),F −1 1 (l 1 ) + η * * (x 1 ) . Note that the latter is non-increasing in η * * . Thus, the limit lim σ→0 + D 1 (x 1 ; σ) = lim σ→0 + 1 0 u 1 (x 1 − σF −1 1 (l 1 ), l 1 , λ 2 (l 1 ))dl 1 = 1 0 u 1 (x 1 , l 1 , λ * 2 (l 1 ; x 1 ))dl 1 exists, is continuous in x 1 , and is strictly increasing in x 1 . The monotonicity is strict by the assumption of the strict state monotonicity A1. Similarly, if we denoteF −1 2 (l, η) the inverse function toF (z, z + η) with respect to z, we obtain ϑ 2 (l 2 ) = x 1 − σF −1 2 (l 2 , η) and λ 1 (l 2 ) =F F −1 2 (l 2 , η * (σ)), −h 2 . Again, both are continuous in x 1 and σ and in the limit σ → 0 + we obtain ϑ 2 (l 2 ) → x 1 and λ 1 (l 2 ) =F F −1 2 (l 2 , η * * ), −h 2 for x 1 considered in the case (c). Therefore also the limit D * 2 (x 1 ) = lim σ→0 + D 2 (x 1 ; σ) exists, and it is continuous in x 1 . Moreover D * 2 (x 1 ) is nondecreasing because we established in the Proof of Lemma 4 that D 2 (x 1 ; σ) increases in x 1 for each σ. Therefore the sum m * dyn (x 1 ) = D * 1 (x 1 ) + D * 2 (x 1 ) exists, is continuous in x 1 , and is strictly increasing in x 1 for x 1 in the range considered in case (c).
Summing up, we have established that the limit m * dyn (x 1 ) is continuous in x 1 for ranges of x 1 considered in all the three cases (a), (b), and (c). Moreover, in case (c), η * * = −(h 1 + h 2 ) if u 2 (x 1 , 0, 0) = 0, and η * * = h 1 + h 2 if 1 0 u 2 (x 1 , 1, l 2 )dl 2 = 0. This implies that m * dyn (x 1 ) continuously connects at the boundaries in between the cases (a) and (c), and in between cases (c) and (b). Proof of Lemma 7. Claim (i) follows directly from Proposition 2.1 in Morris and Shin (2003) and from the assumption of bounded errors. Claim (ii). By continuity of m * dyn , if m * dyn (θ * ) > 0 then m * dyn (θ) is positive on some δ-neighborhood of θ * . Together with the monotonicity of m dyn (θ; σ) with respect to θ it implies that m dyn (θ; σ) is positive in the δ-neighborhood of θ * for σ < σ, for some σ > 0. For sufficiently small σ all players receive signals x i 1 above θ * − δ in round 1 of Γ dyn (σ) whenever Nature draws fundamental θ * . Then, by Proposition 2, action 1 is the unique rationalizable action for all players' realized types in round 1 of Γ dyn (σ) (whenever Nature draws θ * ). The symmetric argument implies that if m * dyn (θ * ) < 0 then action 0 is selected.
Function m * dyn (θ) has a unique root at which none of the actions is selected in round 1 of Γ dyn . Hence the reverse implications hold as well. Let us now introduce and remind notation used in the proofs that follow. Let x 2 (x 1 ; σ) = x 1 + σ(h 1 + h 2 ). If player receives x 2 (x 1 ; σ) in round 2, then she knows with certainty that all the fellow players have received signals at least x 1 in round 1. Similarly, as in the proof of Lemma 1, let L 2 (x 1 ; σ) be the set of types who reach action history 11 if they play the rationalizable strategy in the continuation game Γ 2 (x 1 ; σ); let x(η; σ) be the intersection of ∂L 2 (x 1 ; σ) with the line x 2 − x 1 = ση, where η ∈ [η ∆ , η ∆ ].
(The notation omits dependence of x(η; σ) on x 1 .) Let x 2 (η; σ) be the second coordinate of x(η; σ). We will pay attention to the round 2 signal x 2 (η ∆ ; σ) which has the following property implied by monotonicity of s 2 : all types (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X such that x 1 ≥ x 1 and x 2 ≥ x 2 (η ∆ ; σ) reach action history 11 in Γ 2 (x 1 ; σ). Lemma 8. If strategic uncertainty permits investment at x 1 in round 2, i.e., 1 0 u 2 (x 1 , 1, l 2 )dl 2 > 0, then there exists σ > 0 such that x 2 (η ∆ ; σ) < x 2 (x 1 ; σ) for all σ < σ.
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a sequence σ k → 0 + such that x 2 (η ∆ ; σ k ) ≥ x 2 (x 1 ; σ k ) for all k.
Let us explore beliefs of the type x(η ∆ ; σ k ). First, she knows with certainty that θ ≥ x 1 − σ k h 1 . Second, she knows that l 1 = 1 because only fellow players' signals at least x 1 are compatible with her second signal which is x 2 (x 1 ; σ k ) or larger. Third, her belief about l 2 stochastically dominates uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This is because all players with x i 2 > x 2 (η ∆ ; σ k ) invest in both rounds and a player receiving x i 2 = x 2 (η ∆ ; σ k ) has uniform belief about the proportion of players with the second signal above x 2 (η ∆ ; σ k ). Using all the three observations we get U 2 (x(η ∆ ; σ k )) ≥ 1 0 u 2 (x 1 − σ k h 1 , 1, l 2 )dl 2 .
The right-hand side of (15) is positive for sufficiently small σ k because 1 0 u 2 (x 1 , 1, l 2 )dl 2 is continuous in x 1 . This contradicts the indifference condition U 2 (x(η ∆ ; σ k )) = 0. Lemma 9. If strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ * in round 2 and m * dyn (θ * ) > 0, then action history 11 is selected at θ * in Γ dyn .
Proof of Lemma 9. (See page 32 for notation.) As m * dyn is continuous, m * dyn (θ * − δ) > 0 for some δ > 0. By Lemma 7, action history 11 or 10 is selected at θ * − δ. Thus, there exists σ > 0 such that for σ < σ all players invest in round 1 of Γ dyn (σ) for all signals x i 1 ≥ θ * − δ. We can now apply Lemma 8: choosing δ > 0 small enough so that 1 0 u 2 (θ * − δ, 1, l 2 )dl 2 > 0, we have s 2 (θ * − δ, x 2 (θ * − δ; σ)) = 1 in the unique equilibrium of Γ dyn (σ).
If Nature draws fundamental θ * then types of all players exceed (θ * −σh 1 , θ * −σh 2 ). We can choose σ small enough so that for σ < σ , (θ * − σh 1 , θ * − σh 2 ) > (θ * − δ, x 2 (θ * − δ; σ)) and so that all players invest in both rounds whenever Nature draws fundamental θ * . that 1 0 u 1 (ϑ 1 (l 1 ; x 1 , σ), l 1 , l 2 (l 1 ))dl 1 ≤ 1 0 u 1 (ϑ 1 (l 1 ; x 1 , σ), l 1 , l 1 )dl 1 ≤ ≤ 1 0 u 1 (ϑ 1 (l 1 ; x 1 + 2σ(h 1 + h 2 ), σ), l 1 , l 1 )dl 1 .
Summing the two inequalities we get m dyn (x 1 ; σ) ≤ m st (x 1 + 2σ(h 1 + h 2 ); σ) and, as σ → 0, the inequality (16) .
